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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

:
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a foreign corporation,
RALPH PAHNKE and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 25,

:
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Priority No. 16
Court of Appeals
Case No. 920228-CA

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke petition
the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari and review a
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

May a plaintiff who voluntarily withdraws from an

action and allows the substitution of a new plaintiff, appeal the
dismissal of the action?
2.

Is a trust beneficiary the proper party to

commence an action against third parties for collection of trust
assets allegedly distributed improperly from the trust, when
there is no allegation the trustee has been asked to bring the
action and has refused or when there is no allegation the
interests of the trustee are hostile to the beneficiary?

vi

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.. 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 65
(Utah App. November 13, 1992).

A copy is included in Appendix A.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
(a)

Petitioners seek review of the decision entered

November 13, 1992 by the Utah Court of Appeals.
(b)

The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for

Rehearing in an Order entered December 14, 1992.
(c)

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 and -2a-4 (Rep. Vol. 1992).
LAW DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
There are no specific constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Nature of the Case
This is an action for collection of trust assets.
The Course of Proceedings
Anna Lee Anderson filed her complaint on December 6,
1990, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
Utah.

On April 15, 1991, defendants Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

vii

On July 22, 1991, an amended complaint was filed by
David M. Dudley, a newly substituted plaintiff.

Dean Witter and

Ralph Pahnke moved to dismiss the amended complaint.
The district court granted both motions to dismiss.
The original complaint was dismissed on September 16, 1991; the
amended complaint was dismissed on September 27, 1991.
On October 9, 1991 Anna Lee Anderson appealed; David
Dudley did not.

Oral argument was heard on October 20, 1992.

Disposition in the Court Below
The Court of Appeals reversed.
Pahnke filed a Petition for Rehearing.

Dean Witter and Mr.
It was denied on December

14, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background Information
Norman Anderson created a trust in 1978, naming his
wife, Anna Lee, as beneficiary.
James, to serve as trustee.

He appointed his only child,

R.152. Norman died in 1979, and

James Anderson assumed his duties as trustee of the Norman
Anderson Trust. R.152.
The Trust assets consisted almost exclusively of shares
of stock held in an account in the Salt Lake City branch office
of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

R.147.

In May, 1980, the stock

was distributed from the Trust's account, some going into James'
personal account with Dean Witter and some going into his
viii

mother's personal account.

R.147, Exhibit A; 152-154. Ralph

Pahnke was the Dean Witter account executive for the transaction.
R.147.
Claims of the Parties
On December 6, 1990, Anna Lee Anderson filed an action
against Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah.

R.la; Appendix C.

She brought the action as beneficiary of the Trust.

She

contended the distribution of stock by the trustee violated the
allocation scheme set forth in the Trust instrument and that Dean
Witter and Ralph Pahnke, as stockbrokers, had a common law duty
to supervise the trustee.

She demanded money damages.

Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss
her complaint on April 15, 1991. R.40.

They contended actions

to recover trust assets must be brought by the trustee, not by
the beneficiary and, therefore, Anna Lee lacked standing to sue
and the trustee was an indispensable party.

On July 16, 1991,

the district court granted the motion from the bench, dismissing
Anna Lee's complaint.

R.91.

On July 22, 1991, before the district court had entered
the order of dismissal, an amended complaint was filed. R.92;
Appendix D.

Anna Lee was replaced as the named-plaintiff by

David M. Dudley, the recently appointed successor trustee to
James.

R.92, 154.

Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion
ix

to dismiss Mr. Dudley's amended complaint on August 7, 1991.
R.139.

They contended Mr. Dudley's claims were time-barred

because the complaint alleged the stock distribution occurred in
May 1980 and the action was filed in December 1990, over ten
years later.
The district court signed an Order on September 16,
1991, dismissing Anna Lee's complaint.

R.214-216.

It signed

another Order on September 27, 1991, dismissing David Dudley's
amended complaint.

R.218-221.

On October 9, 1991, Anna Lee filed a notice of appeal.
R.224-225.

The trustee, Mr. Dudley, was not named in the notice

and he did not appeal.

Appendix E.

Disposition in the Court of Appeals
On November 13, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals issued
its opinion, reversing and remanding.

It held Anna Lee Anderson

had standing to bring an action as beneficiary to collect trust
assets and that she could pursue this appeal.

x

ARGUMENT
Introduction
Anna Lee Anderson cannot bring this action as
beneficiary to recover Trust assets, absent allegations the
trustee failed to bring it after demand or that the trustee's
self-interest put him in a position adverse to hers. Anna Lee
failed to make these allegations and the district court properly
dismissed the action.
Immediately following dismissal Anna Lee voluntarily
withdrew as plaintiff in favor of the trustee.
appealed.

She later

Anna Lee was no longer a party and could not appeal.
The Court of Appeals determined both that Anna Lee

could bring her action and that she could file this appeal though
no longer a party.

Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke petition the

Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari to review the Court
of Appeal's decision.

It ignores applicable legal authority and

imposes unworkable rules of law on issues of appellate
jurisdiction and the authority of a beneficiary to assert trust
claims.
Utah case authority does not address the standing of a
former party to appeal after withdrawal.
addresses the issue, however.

Other case law

It holds that a former party,

after withdrawal from the action, cannot appeal.
Appeal's decision is contrary to law.
1

The Court of

The Court of Appeals' decision grants trust
beneficiaries the unfettered authority to sue on behalf of a
trust, without first demanding the trustee bring suit and without
any determination that the trustee is unable to bring suit
because of self-interest.

The Court's ruling is contrary to law.

The Court of Appeals' decision departs from accepted
judicial proceedings within the meaning of Rule 46(c) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Morever, the Court decided an

important question of state appellate jurisdiction which has not
been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court pursuant to
Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED ANNA LEE ANDERSON
HAS STANDING TO APPEAL
Anna Lee Anderson filed this action and later withdrew

as plaintiff.
plaintiff.

She allowed another to be substituted as the sole

Anna Lee was no longer a party to the action

following substitution, and she lost all right to appeal.
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke advised the Court of
Appeals about the jurisdictional problem posed by Anna Lee's
withdrawal and her subsequent notice of appeal.
Respondents at 8-10.

See Brief of

It was the subject of considerable

discussion during oral argument.

Nevertheless, the issue was

relegated to a footnote in the opinion, and what analysis there
is, ignores relevant facts and applicable, controlling case
2

authority.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly decided the issue

for several reasons:
A.

Anna Lee Anderson Substituted David M. Dudley As The
Sole Plaintiff
The Court of Appeals first mischaracterized the effect

of Anna Lee's filing of the amended complaint by saying she
"attempted to file a document labeled Amended Complaint . . . ,"
and that " . . . it was in substance an attempt to substitute a
party plaintiff.11

Opinion, fn. 1 at 2. (emphasis added).

It was

not an attempt.

The First Amended Complaint was filed with the

district court.

Substitution of parties was an accomplished

fact.
The amended complaint was sufficient in and of itself
to substitute Mr. Dudley as plaintiff upon fiing.1

Rule 15 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits free amendment of a
complaint if done before a responsive pleading is filed.

The

only pleading filed by Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke was a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
pleading.

It was not a responsive

Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010

(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("A motion to dismiss . . . is not a
responsive pleading which would preclude an opponent from

1

Anna Lee's motion to amend the complaint, filed six days
after the filing of the amended complaint, was superfluous.
3

amending a complaint under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) %once as a
matter of course.'")
Rule 15's allowance of an amendment "once as a matter
of course" permits substitution of parties.
complaint effectively changed plaintiffs.

The amended

Anna Lee was no longer

a party; she had been replaced by Mr. Dudley.

Roberts v. Husky

Industries. Inc.. 71 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (facing a
motion to dismiss, plaintiff amended the complaint, before a
responsive pleading was filed, to substitute new plaintiffs);
Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1966)
("Rule 15(a) may be used to substitute new plaintiffs."); Rosier
v. Garron. Inc.. 199 S.E.2d 50, 55 (W. Va. 1973) ("[T]he federal
courts . . . have uniformly held that under proper circumstances,
a motion to substitute a party with property capacity to sue is
appropriate under Rule 15."); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1474 at 549-52 (2d ed. 1990) ("[A] party may make
a Rule 15(a) amendment to add, substitute, or drop parties to the
action." (footnotes omitted; emphasis added.))
Anna Lee herself acknowledged substitution had been
achieved.

In a pleading filed with the district court she

admitted:
. . . Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint in this
matter. The Amended Complaint substitutes David M.
Dudley as Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust as the
Plaintiff therein.
4

R.178.

She repeated the admission in a subsequent pleading

before the district court.

R.205-206.

And# she admitted to the

Court of Appeals in her opening appeal brief that she had "filed
an Amended Complaint naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the
Norman Anderson Trust as plaintiff . . . ."

Brief of Appellant,

5 4 at 12.
The First Amended Complaint was filed.
plaintiffs.
B.

It substituted

Anna Lee ceased to be a party.

The Court of Appeals Had the Authority and the Duty to
Determine Jurisdiction
Second, the Court of Appeals explained that the

resolution of the jurisdictional issue depends on the amended
complaint and, because it was reversing the dismissal of the
original complaint and remanding, the Court would not reach any
assignment of error based on the amended complaint.
Court of Appeals could not do.

That the

The Court has the power and the

duty to address every jurisdictional issue.

It has recognized in

prior decisions that "[t]he fundamental and initial inquiry of a
court is always to determine its own jurisdictional
authority. . . . "
Ct. App. 1987).

Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah
That is true even to the point of the Court

raising its own lack of jurisdiction.
Co., 184 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah 1947).

5

Coray v. Southern Pac.

C.

Anna Lee Anderson Did Not Appeal a Final Order
Third, the Court of Appeals held that, in any event,

Anna Lee had appealed the dismissal of the original complaint,
which was itself a final order.

Not so.

The first order of

dismissal might have been final for appeal had Anna Lee not
elected to amend the complaint before the order was entered.
Having done that, the order was at best interlocutory for
purposes of appeal because the controversy between the litigants
had not ended.

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539

(Utah 1979).
In any event, the "finality" of the first dismissal
order is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue raised here.

The

only appropriate question is, "Who can take the appeal of an
otherwise final order?"

Certainly not strangers to the action,

nor those who at the time of appeal are no longer parties.
Lee, by her own admission, was no longer a party.

Anna

She could not

appeal.
D.

Anna Lee Anderson Is Not A Party and Cannot Appeal
The Court of Appeals' decision ignores controlling case

authority which holds that only parties to a lawsuit may appeal.
An illustrative case is Maaicsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson.
924 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1991).
plaintiff.

Magicsilk was the original named

Vader Group, the purchaser of Magicsilk's assets,

6

filed a motion to be substituted as plaintiff.

The motion was

granted.
Vader subsequently refused to cooperate in discovery in
open defiance of a court order.

The trial court dismissed the

action with prejudice as a result.
in the name of Magicsilk.

A notice of appeal was filed

Id. at 125.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noticed the
problem created by the substitution of Vader as plaintiff and the
notice of appeal filed by Magicsilk.

Accordingly, the court

itself raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction which had been
neglected by the parties during briefing.

Id. at 124. It

dismissed the appeal, observing:
This Court lacks jurisdiction over Magicsilk's appeal.
Only parties to a lawsuit may appeal an adverse
judgment. Marino v. Ortiz. 484 U.S. 301f 304, 108
S.Ct. 586, 587, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (per curiam); Bense v.
Starling. 719 F.2d 241, 244 (7th Cir. 1983). Magicsilk
Corp. of New Jersey, the only company listed on the
notice of appeal, has not been a party to this suit
since the district court granted Vader's motion to
substitute.
Id. at 125.
Another illustrative case is Appeal of District of
Columbia Nurses' Ass'n., 854 F.2d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

In that

case several individual nurses and their professional
association, District of Columbia Nurses' Association ("DCNA"),
brought an action challenging the failure of the District of
Columbia to pay appropriate overtime pay under the Fair Labor
7

Standards Act.

The District of Columbia contended DCNA lacked

standing under the Act and in response, plaintiffs moved to amend
their complaint to remove DCNA as a party.
granted.

Their motion was

In spite of withdrawal, DCNA's name continued to appear

in the caption.
Some time later, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the District of Columbia and against the individual
nurses.

A notice of appeal was filed in the name of DCNA.

That

prompted the Court of Appeals to make an inquiry:
This court entered an order to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed since the purported
appellant was no longer a plaintiff at the time of the
judgment and no remaining plaintiff had been identified
as an appellant. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285
(1988) (court of appeals only has jurisdiction over
appeals of parties identified in notice of appeal);
United States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (only party to district court action may note an
appeal).
Id. at 1449.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal.

It

noted the general rule "that an appellant must be a party to the
proceedings in order to file an appeal."

Id. at 1449.

DCNA had

voluntarily removed itself from the action and no longer
considered itself a party.

Id. at 1449.

The court held:

This appeal was noted by a former plaintiff that had
become a stranger to the litigation. No remaining
plaintiff noted an appeal . . . .
Id. at 1451.

Cf., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188 (D.C.

Cir. 1991).
8

Anna Lee Anderson was no longer a party after she withdrew
from the action.
II.

She lost all right to appeal.2

THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THE TRUSTEE IMPROPERLY NEGLECTED TO
BRING THIS ACTION
The Court of Appeals held Anna Lee may bring her action

since the first trustee, her son James, "improperly neglected" to
bring it.

The Court found "neglect" solely from the trustee's

failure to bring suit.
indefensible.

The Court's definition of neglect is

It would completely emasculate the general rule

giving trustees the exclusive right to maintain trust actions.
The Court's error is highlighted by the recent,
well-reasoned opinion of Firestone v. Galbreath. 976 F.2d 279
(6th Cir. 1992).

Beneficiaries of a trust sued a trustee and

third parties on several tort claims.

The trial court dismissed

the action, ruling the beneficiaries lacked standing to pursue
trust claims against third parties.

The beneficiaries were

unable, even though given an opportunity to amend their
complaint, to allege facts (i.e., prior demand on the trustee to
2

David M. Dudley was the only plaintiff remaining after
substitution. Mr. Dudley was not named in the notice of appeal,
however, and he is barred from pursuing this appeal. Torres v.
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988) ("The failure to name
a party in a notice of appeal is more than excusable
* informality'; it constitutes a failure of that party to
appeal."); Maaicsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123,
125 (7th Cir. 1991); Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Practice ("The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal . . . . " ) .
9

sue) necessary to overcome the general rule precluding them from
pursuing trust claims.
In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals first reiterated that "generally only the
trustee may bring an action on behalf of a trust," but went on to
note that "the law makes an exception where the trustee has
refused or neglected to bring a demanded action,"

Id. at 284.

The court rejected the beneficiaries' argument that the trustee's
"improper neglect" was evidenced by the trustee's failure to
bring suit:

"This argument is a transparent exercise in
Both terms, ^refuse' and %neglect,'

semantics by the plaintiffs.

presuppose a demand, which the trustee either will not or forgets
to bring."

Id.

Without allegations of demand made to the

trustee to bring suit for the trust, the beneficiaries lacked
standing to pursue the action.
Firestone correctly interpreted "neglect" and the Court
of Appeals departed from it.

The rule adopted by the Court of

Appeals not only destroys the general rule giving trustees the
exclusive right to bring trust claims, it also relieves
beneficiaries who bring suit for trust claims from the
application of any statute of limitation.

Under the definition

adopted by the Court of Appeals, whenever a beneficiary sues a
third party for a trust claim, it will always mean the trustee
"neglected" to sue.

The interpretation is wrong.
10

A trustee's

neglect to bring an action can only be established by allegations
of demand that suit be brought, followed by the trustee's failure
to act on that demand.
It must be emphasized that the only fact to support the
inference drawn by the Court of the trustee's neglect, was his
failure to bring this suit.
made and refused or ignored.3

There are no allegations demand was
Absent those allegations, the

Court of Appeals could not have determined Anna Lee comes within
the exception.

Anna Lee lacks standing.

The sole authority cited by the Court of Appeals for
its interpretation of "neglect" is Struble v. New Jersey Brewery
Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984).
Struble does not define "neglect."

It does address, however, a

beneficiary's right to sue upon the trustee's failure to do so.
Rather than accepting the Court of Appeal's overly broad approach
—

allowing a beneficiary to sue whenever the trustee does not —

Struble requires the beneficiary to affirmatively allege a breach
of trust by the trustee.

That was not done here.

III. THERE IS NO ALLEGATION OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN ANNA LEE
ANDERSON AND THE TRUSTEE
The Court of Appeals correctly noted the exception that
a beneficiary has standing to pursue a trust claim against a
3

The record makes clear that, far from ignoring or refusing
to act, James brought suit as trustee on other Trust claims in
1987 against these same defendants. R. 53.
11

third party if the interests of the trustee are hostile to the
beneficiary.

The Court incorrectly suggested, however, there is

an indication of hostility between Anna Lee as beneficiary and
her son, James, as original trustee.
The Court of Appeals did not cite any evidence of
hostility.

Neither did it draw from the allegations in the

complaint any inference of hostility between them.
Court.

Nor could the

The most that can be said of the complaint is it alleges

stock held by the Trust was transferred to James by Dean Witter
and Ralph Pahnke.

There is no allegation the trustee ever knew

about the transfer, that he participated in it, or that he
intended it to occur.
The complaint goes to extraordinary lengths to insulate
the trustee.

The entire blame for the transfer is laid at the

feet of Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke.4

Thus, the only

reasonable inference to draw from the face of the complaint is
that the trustee did not know anything was wrong.

How then could

the trustee's interests be hostile to the beneficiary's when they
both allegedly were duped?
CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals held a former party, after
withdrawal from the action, can appeal.
4

The ruling is contrary

Anna Lee blames Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke, stock
brokers, for allowing her son, James, to administer and act on
behalf of the Trust. She holds them to a higher standard than
she does the trustee. The law does not impose such an elevated
standard on stockbrokers.
12

to law from other jurisdictions, although not settled in Utah.
The issue, an important question of appellate jurisdiction,
should be resolved by the Supreme Court.
The Utah Court of Appeals also held a trust beneficiary
has unfettered authority to sue on behalf of a trust, without
first demanding the trustee bring suit and without any
determination that the trustee is unable to bring suit because of
self-interest.

The ruling is contrary to law, and it creates

unworkable rules for trust administration:

making the

beneficiary, not the trustee, responsible for litigation efforts
and allowing a beneficiary to bring suit at any time, without
regard for limitations.

The Supreme Court should settle the

issue.
The Supreme Court should grant a writ of certiorari and
review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
DATED:

January 13, 1993.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

JcteepirT. Palmer
"
Reid E. Lewis
E. Jay Sheen
Attorneys for Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. and
Ralph Pahnke
Defendants, Appellees and
Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 13th day of January, 1993, four
copies of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari were mailed to:
James E. Morton
Ron Wolthius
MORTON, SKEEN & RASMUSSEN
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant, Anna Lee Anderson, appeals an
order granting appellees' motion to dismiss
based on Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), and 19 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse and
remand.

Cite as
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Anna Lee ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., Ralph
Pahnke, and John Does 1 through 25,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 920228-CA
FILED: November 13, 1992
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Jackson

FACTS
On November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson
executed a trust agreement creating the Norman
Anderson Trust. The trust was funded by stock
held in a brokerage account with Dean Witter,
Inc. (Dean Witter). Dean Witter had a copy of
the trust agreement that outlined the terms and
conditions for disbursement of trust assets
James Anderson, the son of Norman Anderson,
was named as trustee for the trust. Anna Lee
Anderson, the wife of Norman Anderson, was
the sole beneficiary of the trust.
On May 8, 1980, stock was distributed, in
violation of the terms of the trust, from the trust
into accounts James Anderson and Anna Lee
Anderson held with Dean Witter. The
distribution was made pursuant to a letter
authorizing the distribution prepared by Ralph
Pahnke, an employee of Dean Witter
Subsequent to the distribution of the stock, Dean
Witter continued to manage Anna Lee
Anderson's account. During the term of Dean
Witter's management, the assets held m Anna
Lee Anderson's account became worthless
When Anna Lee Anderson learned of the
improper distributions m December 1990, she
filed a complaint against Pahnke and Dean
Witter on December 6, 1990. She sought
damages for breach of contract, tortious
interference with contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, and negligence The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss on April 15, 1991, alleging
that the complaint failed to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the proper
party did not bring the complaint and that the
complamt failed to name the trustee as an
indispensable party pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7)
and 19 ' The trial court entered an order
dismissing the complamt on September 16,
1991
ISSUES
On appeal, Anna Lee Anderson contends her
complamt was improperly dismissed because (1)
she was a proper party to bring the suit, and (2)
the trustee was not an indispensable party to the
action
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on
Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate court must accept the
material allegations of the complamt as true, and
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only
if it clearly appears the complainant can prove
no set of facts in support of his or her claims
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Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991);
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,
624 (Utah 1990). The facts of the complaint are
to be liberally construed and the court must
consider all the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff. St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah
1991). "Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6)
dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial
court's ruling no deference and review it under
a correctness standard." Id.

CodfCo
Provo, Utah

761 (D.N.J. 1957) (where trustee transfers
property in breach of trust with assistance of
third parties, third parties are primarily liable to
the beneficiary, rather than to the trustee; the
right of the beneficiary against the third party is
a direct right not derived through the trustee);
Hoyle v. Dickinson, 746 P.2d 18, 20 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (trust beneficiary may bring action
for damages against third party for breach of
trust agreement); Apollinari v. Johnson, 305
N.W.2d 565, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(beneficiary may sue third party without joining
trustee).
Further, most jurisdictions follow the general
ANALYSIS
The appellees allege that Anna Lee Anderson, rule set out in Restatement (Second) of Trusts
as a beneficiary to the trust, was not the proper §282 (1976), providing in part:
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an
party to bring suit against them. Therefore,
action at law or suit in equity or other
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), appellees allege Anna
proceeding against a third person if the
Lee Anderson failed to state a claim because she
trustee held the property free of trust, the
did not have a nexus with the claim. The trial
beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in equity
court agreed and dismissed the complaint,
against the third person, except as stated in
finding the trustee should have brought the suit
Subsections (2) and (3).
rather than the beneficiary.
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or
Dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
neglects to bring an action against the third
is proper if the plaintiff fails to properly allege
person, the beneficiary can maintain a suit
standing. See Ashe Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan,
in equity against the trustee and the third
969 F.2d 868, 872 (10th Cir. 1992); Grider v.
person.
Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989). (Emphasis added.)
Rule 17 provides insight concerning standing to
In the present situation, it is clear from the
sue in a trust action: "Every action shall be complaint the beneficiary could prove facts
prosecuted in the name of the real party in showing she had standing to bring suit against
interest. ... [A] trustee of an express trust ... the third parties for the improper distribution of
may sue in that person's name without joining stock. She could show, at the very least, the
the party for whose benefit the action is trustee improperly "neglected" to bring action
brought." Utah R. Civ. P. 17 (1992) (emphasis against the appellees when he waited over ten
added).2
years after the improper transfer and still did not
Although Rule 17 clearly allows the trustee to bring suit. See Struble v. New Jersey Brewery
sue on behalf of the beneficiary, it does not Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325,
prevent the beneficiary from suing third parties 337 (3rd Cir. 1984) (where trustee may sue and
wrongfully fails to do so, the beneficiary may
directly:
sue the party or parties the trustee failed to sue).
It should be noted that the enumerations
We conclude Anna Lee Anderson stated a
[e.g., trustee and guardian] are couched in
cause of action against the appellees because she
permissive language. The beneficial owner,
could prove facts showing she had standing as
therefore, is not precluded from suing, nor
beneficiary to pursue the claim. Therefore, the
from joining with the legal title holder, nor
trial court erred in finding the trustee was the
from being joined, if the beneficial owner
only proper party to bring the action. Because
has the right sought to be enforced. Whether
we find that Anna Lee was a proper party to
he has . . . will be determined by principles
bring suit, we need not reach appellees claim
of substantive law.
3A James W. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal that because the trustee was the only party
Practice §17.12 at 17-118. (2d ed. 1992) eligible to bring the action, the trustee should
have been named as an indispensable party
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).3
Although Utah substantive law is especially pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
sparse in this area, it appears the beneficiary has Procedure.
the right to bring an action against a third party
CONCLUSION
when the beneficiary's interests are hostile to
The trial court improperly dismissed Anna Lee
those of the trustee. Salina Canyon Coal Co. v.
Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 P. 161 (1930). Other Anderson's complaint because it is clear that she
jurisdictions also allow a beneficiary to sue third could prove f&cts showing she has standing to
parties directly. E.g., Alioto v. United States, bring claims as a beneficiary against the
593 F. Supp. 1402, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (in appellees. Therefore, we reverse the decision of
action where beneficiary has been damaged by the trial court and remand the case for further
trustee and third party, beneficiary may bring proceedings consistent with this opinion.
action against third party separately); Booth v.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co.. 155 F. Supp. 755,
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WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. After a minute entry dismissing the complaint, but
prior to the entry of the order formally dismissing the
complaint, Anna Lee Anderson attempted to file a
document labeled "Amended Complaint" naming a
substituted trustee as a party in the caption of the
document. Otherwise the document was identical to
the complaint. Accordingly, it was in substance an
attempt to substitute a party plaintiff The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss the "Amended
Complaint" on September 27, 1991. The order did not
state any ground or basis for the ruling but the motion
claimed a statute of limitations bar. Although Anna
Lee Anderson also appealed the dismissal of the
"Amended Complaint," we need not reach that issue
because we are reversing the dismissal of the original
complaint.
Appellees claim Anderson cannot appeal the original
complaint because she was not listed as a party to the
"Amended Complaint." However, because we are not
reaching the issues presented in the "Amended
Complaint" and subsequent motion to dismiss, and
because Anderson is appealing a final order, we find
that Anderson properly appealed the dismissal of the
original complaint. See Salt Lake City Corp v
Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979)
2. Rule 17 seeks to protect the interests of judicial
economy and fairness to the parties in litigation Kemp
v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984) "The
reason the defendant has the right to have the cause of
action prosecuted by the real party in interest is so
that the judgment will preclude any action on the same
demand by another and permit the defendant to assert
all defenses or counterclaims available against the real
owner of the cause " Id (quoting Shaw v Jeppson,
121 Utah 155, 163, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (1952))
3. Utah Code Ann. §75-7-402(3)(z) (Supp 1992) also
provides that a trustee has the power to "prosecute or
defend actions, claims or proceedings for the
protection of the trust assets and of the trustee in the
performance of his duties " While this statute
empowers the trustee to sue on behalf of the
beneficiary, it does not preclude Anderson from suing
in her capacity as beneficiary
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Anna Lee Anderson,

ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 920228-CA

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
Ralph Pahnke, and John Does 1
through 25,
Defendants and Appellees.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellees'
Petition for Rehearing, filed December 4, 1992,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellees' Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this 14th day of December, 1992
FOR THE COURT:

Mary^T/ Noonan
ClericJof t h e Court

/ / • • • .

o
i M
•^

JAMES E. MORTON (A 3739)
PAUL D. HATCH (#1418)
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801) 484-3000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA LEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT
(JURY DEMANDED)

vs.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
RALPH PAHNKE and
JOHN DOES I through XXV,
Defendants.

9009 en it t> cJ

C i v i l No.
Judged ':"."•-• s

Plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson, by and through her counsel
of record, Thompson, Hatch, Morton & Skeen, and for causes of
action, complains against Defendants as follows:
PARTIES
1.

Anna Lee Anderson is an individual residing in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. is a foreign

corporation and is doing business in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah,

3.

Defendant Ralph Pahnke is an individual residing in

the State of Utah.
4.

The true names and capacities of Defendants named

herein as John Does I through XXV, inclusive, are unknown to
Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious
names.

Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint to

include their true names and capacities when the same have been
ascertained.

Plaintiff alleges that each of the Defendants

designated herein as John Does I through XXV were responsible, in
some manner, based upon the acts and omissions set forth hereafter, for the events and occurrences referred to hereinafter and
for the resulting injury and damage to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff

further alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as
John Does I through XXV were, for all relevant periods, an agent
or employee of the other Defendants herein, and were at all times
hereinafter mentioned acting within the purpose and scope of said
agency or employment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5.

On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson

executed a Trust Agreement which created the Norman Anderson
Trust.
6.

On or about November 28, 1978, Plaintiff Anna Lee

Anderson executed a Trust Agreement which created the Anna Lee
Anderson Trust.
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7.

In addition, during the approximate same period of

time, both Norman Anderson and Anna Lee Anderson executed their
respective Last Wills and Testaments.
8.

Shortly after the execution by Norman Anderson of

the Trust Agreement establishing the Norman Anderson Trust, Norman
Anderson transferred certain property into said Trust.

Included

in such transfer were 20,500 shares of the common stock of Levi
Straus & Co.
9.

James N. Anderson, Norman Anderson and Anna Lee

Anderson's son, was designated by the Norman Anderson Trust
Agreement as the Trustee for such Trust.
10.

On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson

established an account with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
at its Salt Lake City office.
11.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. was furnished

a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at the time such
Trust Account was opened with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
12.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. forwarded a

copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement to its trust department located at the regional office of Dean Witter Reynolds in San
Francisco, California.
13.

The Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San

Francisco, California reviewed said Trust Agreement and sent
directives to the Salt Lake City office of Dean Witter Reynolds,

3

Inc. with respect to the handling by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of
the Norman Anderson Trust.
14.

The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, a copy of

which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", provides for the creation
upon the death of Norman Anderson of two trusts, namely, a
"Marital Trust" and a "Family Trust".
15.

The

provisions

of the Norman Anderson

Trust

Agreement direct the Trustee, and third parties dealing with the
Trustee, with respect to the maintenance, administration, management, and distribution of assets held in said Trust.
16.

The Marital Trust requires the Trustee to dis-

tribute income from the Marital Trust to Anna Lee Anderson on at
least a quarterly basis.
17.

In addition, the Marital Trust allows the Trustee

to make distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson for her
care, comfort, support and maintenance including the purchase of
residences.
18.

The Marital Trust also provides that the Trustee

may make distributions of principal to any person designated in
writing by Anna Lee Anderson.
19.

The

Family Trust

allows the Trustee

to make

distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson, provided income
from all other sources (including the Marital Trust) are insufficient for her care, comfort, support and maintenance.
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20.

The Family Trust provides for the distribution of

the balance of the Family Trust assets after Anna Lee Anderson's
death.
21.

On or about May 8, 1980, Defendant Ralph Pahnke

prepared a letter on the letterhead of Defendant Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. which provided for the distribution of 41,000
shares of the common stock of Levi Straus & Co. as follows:
a.

24,118 shares were distributed to the personal

securities account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of James N.
Anderson;
b.

16,882 shares were distributed to the Anna Lee

Anderson Trust Account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
22.

The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-

buted to James N. Anderson amounted to $871,238.63.
23.

The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-

buted to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust amounted to $609,845.36.
24.

Neither of the distributions were in accordance

with the provisions, terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement which was in the possession of Defendant Pahnke
and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
25.

Subsequent to such distributions, Defendant Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc. continued to manage the Anna Lee Anderson
Trust Account.

During the terms of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.fs

management of such Trust Account, the Trust Account became
valueless.
5

26.

The distributions

induced by

and

affected by

Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds were unlawful,
and in direct contravention of the provisions of the Norman
Anderson Trust Agreement.
27.

Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Rey-

nolds, Inc. owed Anna Lee Anderson, the beneficiary of the Norman
Anderson Trust, a duty of inquiry and a duty of good faith dealing
when effectuating transactions with the Trustee of such Trust.
28.

In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. were required by applicable law to not assist,
induce, aid, abet, or in any other manner facilitate transactions
that were in violation Qf the terms of the Trust Agreement.
29.

The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. was malicious, and wholly without good cause or
good faith.
30.

As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful,

illegal, negligent, and unconscionable acts of Defendants Pahnke
and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged in an
amount to be proven at trial.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF CONTRACT)
31.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein.
32.

When Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc. accepted an account with the Norman Anderson Trust, they con6

tracted with said Trust to comply with applicable rules and
regulations of the New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, as well as Federal and State law.
33.

In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. contracted to manage the accounts with the highest
standards of fair dealing.
34.

The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. as hereinabove alleged constitutes a breach in
violation of the third party beneficiary contract existing between
Anna Lee Anderson and Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT)
35.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein.
36.

The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. hereinabove alleged constitutes an unlawful and
tortious interference with the contract rights of Plaintiff.
37.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants

Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s unlawful and tortious
conduct, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at
trial.
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38.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s

conduct was wholly without good cause or good faith.
39.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive

damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter.
40.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees in connection with the prosecution of this action,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY)
41.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein.
42.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

carefully reviewed the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement to the extent that such Trust Agreement was
forwarded to the Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San
Francisco, California for scrutiny.
43.

In accepting the Norman Anderson Trust and opening

a securities account for said Trust, Defendants Pahnke and Dean
Witter Reynolds became de facto trustees of the Norman Anderson
Trust.
44.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

owed Plaintiff the degree of care and loyalty imposed upon
trustees by applicable law.
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45.
breached

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

and violated their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff in

undertaking the wrongful conduct as hereinabove alleged.
46.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants

Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s breach of fiduciary duty,
Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
47.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of. punitive

damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter.
48.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in connection with the prosecution of
this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(NEGLIGENCE)
49.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein•
50.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

owed Plaintiff a duty to not induce or facilitate the violation of
any provision of the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement.
51.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

breached and violated their duty to Plaintiff as hereinabove
alleged.
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52.

As a direct and proximate result of the careless,

negligent, reckless, and unlawful acts and omissions of Defendants
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged
in an amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., jointly and severally,
as follows:
A.

On Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for breach of

contract, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

(ii)

For costs of Court incurred herein; and

trial;

(iii) For such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper in the premises.
B.

On Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for tortious

interference with contract, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

trial;
(ii) For punitive damages in an amount calculated
to punish and deter;
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including
reasonable attorney's fees;
10

(iv) For such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper in the premises.
C.

On Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for breach of

fiduciary duty, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

trial;
(ii) For punitive damages in an amount calculated
to punish and deter;
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including
reasonable attorney's fees;
(iv) For such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper in the premises.
D.

On Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for negli-

gence, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

trial;
(ii) For costs of Court incurred herein; and
(iii) For such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper in the premises.
/

DATED this

b

^

day of December, 1990.
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN

ffi&LL

By_
James E. Morton
Paul D. Hatch
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiff, by and through her counsel

of record,

Thompson, Hatch, Morton & Skeen, hereby demands a trial by jury in
this matter.
DATED this

O

day of December, 1990.
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN

PJ/MU

By_
James E. Morton
Paul D. Hatch
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
866 16th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103
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TRUST AGREEMENT

THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is made this
y^c-VV\?SE.vL

/JL6 day of

r 1978, between NORMAN .ANDERSON of Salt

Lake City, Utah, hereinafter sometimes called the "Trustor"
and JAMES N. ANDERSON, of Park City, Utah, hereinafter
sometimes called the "Trustee".
Trustor does hereby transfer to the Trustee the
property listed on Schedule "A" and the Trustee agrees to
hold such property and any other property added to this
Trust on the terms and conditions stated herein.

Trustor

or any other person or persons may add such other property
to the trust property as may be acceptable to the Trustee
by either inter vivos or testamentary 'transfer; and such
additional property when delivered to the Trustee shall
become a part of the Trust and be held by the Trustee on
the terms and conditions stated herein.
ARTICLE I
DESIGNATION AND PURPOSE OF TRUST
1.1

Designation.

This Trust may be designated

the NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST.
1.2

Purpose.

This Trust is established for the

primary benefit of Trustor during Trustor's lifetime and
of Trustor's family.

Trustor's family consists of Trustor's

wife, Anna Lee Anderson, and Trustor's son, James N.
Anderson.

kXHiriT

-2-

ARTICLE II
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL
DURING THE LIFETIME OF TRUSTOR
During the lifetime of the Trustor, such paxt
or all of the income and/or principal of the trust es%tate
shall be paid or delivered to such persons and in such
amounts from time to time as the Trustor shall direct

m

writing signed by Trustor and delivered to Trustee; or in
the absence of such direction, the Trustee shall pay or
apply for the benefit of a class consisting of Trustor
and Trustor's wife or any member of such class, such
amounts to such persons as in his sole and absolute discretion he deems necessary and proper for the health,
support, maintenance and welfare of Trustor and said
wife.
ARTICLE III
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL
UPON DEATH OF TRUSTOR
3.1

Settlement of Debts and Expenses.

Upon

the death of the Trustor, the Trustee may, in th sole and
absolute discretion of the Trustee, pay from the Trust or
advance such sums to the estate or personal representative
of Trustor, with or without interest, as may be necessary
for the settlement of Trustor's estate, such amounts as
expenses of his last illness, funeral and burial, debts
of the Trustor, inheritance taxes, estate taxes and other

-3-

taxes imposed by the state or federal government, and any
and all expenses of administration of Trustor's estate.
Provided, however, that the foregoing may not be satisfied
from the proceeds (i) of any life insurance policy on the
life of Trustor, or (ii) of any death benefit payable by
reason of the Trustor having been a participant in an employee
benefit plan if such proceeds are not included in the
Trustor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
3.2

Trustor's Family.

Upon the death of Trustor,

the Trustee may make the payments provided in Section 3.1,
if any, or make adequate provision therefor, and shall
divide and distribute the trust estate then remaining,
including income, as follows:
3.2.1

Wife Not Surviving.

If Trustor's

wife does not survive Trustor (and it is hereby
directed that for purposes-of this Trust if
Trustor and Trustor's wife shall die under
circumstances that it is difficult or impossible
to determine who died first, Trustor's wife shall
be presumed to have survived Trustor), the .Trustee
shall hold, administer and distribute the trust
estate, including all assets

distributable to

the Trust by reason of the death of Trustor, in
one Trust, to be called the "Family Trust" to
be administered as provided in 3.4.

-4-

3.2.2

Wife Surviving.

If Trustor's wife

does survive Trustor, the Trustee shall divide
the trust estate, including all assets distributable to the Trust by reason of the death of
Trustor, into two separate trusts, the first to
be called the "Marital Trust" and the second the
"Family Trust" to be administered as provided in
3-3 and 3.4.
A.

Marital Trust Allocation.

There

shall be placed in the Marital Trust
that portion of the trust estate which
is equal in value, as finally determined for
federal estate tax purposes, to the amount
which is equal to the lesser of:
(1)

The maximum allowable marital

deduction under federal estate tax laws;
or
(2)

The minimum amount which, after

allowing for any unified credit which has
not been allowed during Trustor's lifetime, and any other deductions, exemptions
or credits which will result in no federal
estate tax being imposed on Trustor's
estate.
and which is reduced by the value of any property
or any interests in property as finally determine)
for federal estate tax purposes which passes
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or has passed from Trustor to Trustor's wife,
other than through the Marital Trust, by
reason of said wife being a surviving 'joint
tenant, or an insurance beneficiary, inchoate
dower or any statutory interest similar
thereto, by operation of law, or otherwise.
However, there shall not be allocated to the
Marital Trust, any property or interest in
property or the proceeds of any property or
assets which do not qualify for the marital
deduction for federal estate tax purposes;
nor shall there be allocated to the Marital
Trust except when other assets are insufficient to satisfy such fractional share, any
property or interest in property or the
proceeds -of any property or assets (i) with
respect to which any tax credit or deduction
shall be available because it is subject to
both federal estate and federal income tax;
or (ii) with respect to which any estate or
death taxes are paid to any foreign country
or any of its possessions or subdivisions.
The Marital Trust shall not be reduced for
any inheritance or estate taxes, payable as
a result of the death of Trustor.

The Trustee •

must allocate to the Marital Trust property
or assets, including cash, fairly representative
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of the appreciation or depreciation in the
value of all property available for distribution to such Trust.
B.

Family Trust Allocation.

There

shall be placed in the Family Trust that
portion of the trust estate not allocated
to the Marital Trust.
3.3

Marital Trust.

The estate and property of the

Marital Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts as
follows:
3.3.1

Distribution During Lifetime of Wife.

During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after Trustor's
death:
A.

The Trustee shall pay to the

Trustor's wife, commencing as of the date of
Trustor's death, all of the income from the
Trust in monthly or other convenient installments, but in no event less frequently than
in quarter-annual installments; and
B.

Whenever the Trustee determines that

the funds available to Trustor's wife from
all sources, including the income from the
Marital Trust, are not sufficient for the
proper care, maintenance, support and travel,
including but not limited to the needs arising
from illness, accident or misfortune of
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Trustor's wife and family, and for funds
to enable the purchase of residences, the
Trustee, at any time and from time to time,
may in his sole discretion pay or distribute
to Trustor's wife so much of the principal
of the Trust as he shall deem necessary or
advisable under the circumstances.
C.

The Trustee shall pay out of

principal of the Marital Trust such amount
or amounts, up to the full amount thereof,
as Trustor's wife shall from time to time
designate in writing delivered to Trustee
to any person or persons, including Trustor's
wife.
3.3.2

Distributions on Death of Wife.

Upon

the death of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall pay
over, deliver and distribute all of the rest,
residue and remainder of the Trust to such persons and parties, including the estate of Trustor's*
wife, as Trustor's wife shall direct or appoint by
provision of the last will of said wife specifically
referring to this power of appointment; to the
extent this general power of appointment is not
exercised, then upon the death of Trustor's wife
the Trustee shall continue to hold, administer
and distribute the remainder of the Marital Trust
as shall not have been appointed by Trustor's
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wife, subject to and under the provisions of 3.4.
3.4

Family Trust.

The estate and property of the

Family Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts
as follows:
3.4.1
Wife.

Distributions During Lifetime o'f

During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after

Trustor's death, whenever the Trustee determines
that the funds available to Trustor's wife from all
sources, including the income and principal from
the Marital Trust are not sufficient for the proper
care, maintenance, support and travel, including but
not limited to the needs arising from illness,
accident or misfortune of Trustor's wife, and for
funds to enable the purchase of residences, the
Trustee, at any time and from time to time, may
in his sole discretion pay or distribute to Trustor's
wife so much of the income and/or principal of the
Trust as he shall deem necessary or advisable under the
circumstances.
3.4.2

Distribution on Death of Wife,

Upon

the death of Trustor's wife, if Trustor's wife
survives Trustor; the Trustee shall distribute the
remainder of the Family Trust to or for the benefit
of a class or any member or members thereof consisting of Trustor's son, the descendants of Trustor's
son, including any of such descendants now living
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or hereafter born, the spouses of Trustor's son and
the spouses of the descendants of Trustor's son
(including surviving spouses of Trustor's deceased
son and his descendants) as Trustor's wife shall direct
or appoint by provision of the last will of said
wife specifically referring to this special power
of appointment; to the extent this special power, of
appointment is not exercised, then upon the death
of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall distribute
the remainder of the Family Trust as shall not have
been appointed by Trustor's wife to Trustor's son,
James N. Anderson, if he is then living, but if he
is not then living to Trustor's son's then living
descendants, upon the principle of representation,
subject to the provisions of 3.5.

If none of the

descendants of Trustor are then-living, the Trustee
shall distribute the entire trust estate to the
heirs at law of Trustor as determined pursuant to
the laws of descent and distribution of the State
of Utah in effect at such time as if Trustor had
died at such time.
3.4.3

Distribution on Death of Trustor.

Upon Trustor's death if Trustor's wife does not
survive Trustor, the Trustee shall distribuye the
Family Trust to Trustor's son, James N. Anderson,
if he is then living but if he is not then living to
Trustor's son's then living descendants upon the
principle of representation, subject to the provisions
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of 3.5.

If none of "the descendants of Trustor are

then living, the Trustee shall distribute the entire
trust estate to the heirs at law.of Truster as determined pursuant to the laws of descent and distri^
bution of the State of Utah in effect at such time
as if Trustor had died at such time.
3.5

Minor Beneficiaries Trust.

If under any

provision of this Trust any beneficiary becomes entitled
to final distribution of any share or portion of the trust
estate and such beneficiary is not of the age of 21 years,
the share of such beneficiary shall be retained by the
Trustee, until such beneficiary attains the age of 21
years, paying out such portion of the income and principal
thereof as the Trustee in its sole discretion deems necessary
or advisable to provide for the care, comfort, support,
maintenance and education of such beneficiary and distributing any undistributed portion of such share or portion
of a share to such beneficiary when he or she attains
the age of 21 years, or to his or her estate if he or
she should die before attaining the age of 21 years.
ARTICLE IV
AMENDMENT OR REVOCATION
4.1

During Lifetime of Trustor.

The Trustor

reserves the right at any time or times to amend or revoke
this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in
part, by an instrument or instruments in writing signed
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by Trustor and delivered in Trustor's lifetime to the
Trustee.

If this instrument is revoked in its entirety,

the revocation shall take effect upon the delivery of the
required writing to the Trustee.

On the revocation of this

instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to
the Trustor, or as Trustor may direct in the instrument of
revocation, all of the trust property.
4.2

By Will of Trustor.

The Trustor reserves

the right to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts
hereunder, in whole or in part, by his last will which
specifically refers to this instrument and specifically
directs what amendments are to be made or states that
the instrument is revoked.

If this instrument is revoked

in its entirety by the last will of the Trustor, the Trustee
shall deliver to the Trustor's estate, or as Trustor's
will may direct, all of the trust property.
4.3

Acceptance by Trustee.

If this Trust or

any provision thereof is amended, the amendment shall
take effect only when accepted in writing by the Trustee.
This Trust shall be irrevocable and unamendable during
any period of incompetency, of the Trustor and shall become
irrevocable and unamendable upon the death of the Trustor
or prior thereto if by amendment Trustor has relinquished
all of Trustor's right to amend or revoke this instrument.
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ARTICLE V
POWERS OF TRUSTEE
The Trustee shall have all of the powers as- stated
in Part 4 of Chapter 7 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and
entitled Uniform Trustee's Powers Provisions.

In addition

thereto and not by way of limitation, the Trustee shall
have the power, to retain any asset originally or later
contributed to the trust estate whether or not such asset
be of a character permissible for investment by fiduciaries;
to retain and purchase assets with a view to possible
increase in value notwithstanding the amount or absence
of income therefrom; to retain and purchase assets notwithstanding the lack of diversification of the trust
assets; to retain, purchase, sell or exchange any and all
stocks, bonds, notes or other securities or any variety
of real or personal property, including stocks or mteres-ts
in investments, mutual funds to make distributions of
principal or income in kind; to enter into any transaction,
including, but not limited by advancing funds, purchasing
assets, selling assets (and paying, with or without arrangements for reimbursement, any sums necessary for the settlement of the estate of Trustor) with the Trustee or legal
representative of any other trust or estate in which any
beneficiary hereunder has any beneficial interest even thougn
such Trustee or legal representative is also Trustee hereunder; and to commingle the funds and assets of any trust

-13estate hereunder with any other trust estate hereunder so
long as proper records are kept of the assets allocable
to any such trust.
ARTICLE VI
INSURANCE PROVISIONS
6.1

Power in the Trustor.

The Trustor reserves

the right by Trustor's own act alone, without the consent
or approval of the Trustee, to sell, assign or hypothecate
any policies of insurance made payable to the Trusteehereunder, to exercise any option or privilege granted by
such policies, including, but without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiary of
such policies, and to receive all payments, dividends,
surrender values, benefits or privileges of any kind which
may accrue on account of such policies during Trustor's
lifetime.

Furthermore, the Trustee agrees to deliver to

the Trustor on Trustor's written request signed by Trustor
and delivered to Trustee any of such policies deposited
with the Trustee hereunder.
6.2

Duties of Trustee.

The Trustee shall hold

any policies of insurance which may be deposited with
him, but without any obligation to pay premiums, assessments or other charges upon any of the policies or to
otherwise preserve them or any of them as binding contracts of insurance.

Upon the death of the insured or

upon the maturity date of any policy assigned or payable
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to the Trustee, the Trustee shall take such proceedings as
in his judgment he shall deem necessary to collect all
proceeds due on the policies and he may, if he so elects,
exercise any settlement options available under the policies.
The Trustee is authorized to compromise and adjust claims
arising out of such insurance policies, upon such terms
and conditions as the Trustee shall deem advisable, and to
the extent necessary may maintain or defend any suit,
provided, however, the Trustee shall be under no duty
to maintain or enter into any litigation unless his expenses,'
including counsel fees and costs, have been advanced or
guaranteed in an amount and in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the Trustee.

The Trustee may repay any advances

made by him or reimburse himself for any such fees and costs
out of the principal or income of this Trust.

The receipt

of the Trustee to the insurer shall be a full discharge
of the insurer and Trustee alone shal] thereafter be required
to see to the application of the proceeds.
ARTICLE VII
THE TRUSTEE
7.1

Accounting.

With respect to each separate

trust created herein, the Trustee shall render annually
an account of income and principal, including a statement
of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to
all beneficiaries then eligible to receive income or to
the natural or legal guardians of such beneficiaries, upon,
but only upon the request of any such beneficiary.
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7.2

Bond.

No bond shall be required of the

original Trustee hereunder or of any successor trustee
or, if bond is required by law, no surety on such bond
shall be required.
7.3

Compensation.

The Trustee shall be entitled

to a reasonable fee for his services commensurate with
fees charged by corporate trustees in Salt Lake City, Utah
for similar services.

The Trustee may charge a reasonable

fee for transfers to a successor trustee and for any final
distribution of any share of the trust estate based upon the
work involved in such transfer or final distribution.
7.4

Resignation.

The Trustee may resign at any

time by giving thirty (30) days written notice to Trustor,
or, after the death of the Trustor, to Trustor's wife.
Upon such notice, Trustor, or after the death of Trustor,
Trustor's wife may appoint a successor trustee.

If no such

appointment is made within thirty (30) days after the
Trustee gives its notice of resignation, then the District
Court of Salt Lake County or any judge thereof may appoint
a successor trustee upon application of the resigning
Trustee or of any other interested party.
7- 5

Removal.

The Trustee may be removed by the

Trustor or after the death of the Trustor, by Trustor's
wife by giving thirty (30) days written notice signed
by Trustor, or Trustor's wife, as the case may be and

-16-

delivered to Trustee, in which the successor trustee
is designated to the then acting Trustee.
7.6

Successor Trustee.

A successor trustee may

be either a corporation authorized under applicable law to
act as trustee or an individual.

Any such successor trustee

shall act as Trustee hereunder without the execution or
filing of any writing or any further action on the part of
Trustor or of his wife or of any beneficiary hereunder.

Upon

the appointment of a successor trustee, the former Trustee
shall promptly make an accounting and distribute all
assets of the trust estate to the successor trustee.

An

additional or successor trustee shall not be liable for
any action taken by the Trustee prior to the time such
additional or successor trustee becomes a trustee.
ARTICLE VIII
MISCELLANEOUS
8.1

Powers of Appointment.

The power of the

donee over any power of appointment granted in this agreement shall include all lawful exercises thereof, without
limitation, specifically including but not limited to,
the power to make appointments outright to, or to a trustee
to hold in trust for the exclusive benefit of, any one or
more of the object of the power; to create life estates
and other limited estates; to create general and special
powers of appointment and to appoint subject to lawful
spendthrift restrictions and other lawful conditions, provided that no one other than an object of the power is
benefited thereby.
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8.2

Spendthrift Clause.

The interest of each

beneficiary in the income or principal of any trust created
hereunder shall be free from the control or interference
of any creditor of a beneficiary or of any spouse of a
married beneficiary and shall not be subject to attachment
or susceptible of anticipation or alienation.

Nothing con-

tained in this paragraph 8.2 shall be construed as restricting
in any way the exercise of any power or discretion granted
hereunder.
8.3

Definitions.

References herein to "child"

or "children" refer only to the child designated in
Article I.

References herein to "descendant" or "descendants"

shall mean lawful blood descendants in the first, second or
other degree of the ancestor designated and, in all such
cases, (a) an adopted child and such adopted child's lawful blood descendants shall be considered as lawful blood
descendants of the adopting parent or parents and of anyone
who is by blood or adoption an ancestor of the adopting
parent or of either of the adopting parents, and (b) a
child in gestation which is later born alive shall be
regarded as a child in being during the period of gestation.
8.4 Governing Law.

This agreement has been

accepted by the Trustee in the State of Utah and all
questions concerning its construction shall be governed
by the laws of that state.

All questions concerning the

administration of the Trust shall be governed by the laws
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of the jurisdiction in which the principal office of the
Trustee (from time to time acting) is located.
8.5

Invalid Provisions.

If any provision of

this Trust is held to be invalid, none of the other provisions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative,
but such provisions shall be given full force and effect
as herein provided.

If any provisions of this trust

instrument violate the rules against perpetuities now or
hereafter in effect, in the state within which this Trust
is being administered, that portion of the trust or trusts
so affected shall be administered as herein provided until
the termination of the maximum period authorized by law,
at which time and forthwith such part of the said trust
estate so affected shall be distributed in fee simple to
the beneficiary or beneficiaries in the proportions in
which they are then entitled to enjoy the benefits so
terminated.

For purposes of computing such time rules,

the lives in being shall be those of the Trustor, Trustor's
wife and their descendants living at the time the trust
or trusts herein established become irrevocable.
8.6

Residence Property.

If any residence of

Trustor or Trustor's wife is or becomes a part of any
trust estate created hereunder, the Trustee is authorized
and directed to allow Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either
of them, to use and occupy any such residence without payment
of rent therefor for so long as Trustor and Truster's wife,
or either of them, continue to so occupy such residence or
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residences.

During such occupancy, Trustor hereby authorizes

but does net direct Trustee, to pay, in his discretion,
from the income or principal of the trust estate which
holds an interest in any such residence, any taxes, assessments, fire and casualty and liability insurance premiums,
maintenance costs, ordinary repairs and replacements and
reasonable improvements for any such residence.

With the

written consent of Trustor, or after Trustor's death,
Trustor's wife, signed by Trustor or Trustor's wife, as
the case may be, and delivered to Trustee, the Trustee
may sell such residence.

If requested in such writing

the proceeds of the sale (together with any additional
assets of the trust estate) shall be used by the Trustee
to purchase, acquire, or build a substitute residence,
taking title in the name of the Trustee and allowing
Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either of them, to occupy
such residence on the terms previously set out in this
paragraph.

If a substitute residence is not requested in

such writing, the proceeds of the sale of any such residence
shall be held, administered and distributed by the Trustee
pursuant to the terms of the Trust estate involved without
regard to this paragraph.
8.7

Trustee May Rely on Wills - Presumption

In ascertaining whether there has been an amendment of this
Trust by the last will of the Trustor or whether there has
been an exercise of any powers which have been granted to
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any beneficiary herein and which may be exercised by any
such beneficiary's last will, the Trustee shall be protected
in relying upon an instrument admitted to probate in any
jurisdiction as the last will of the Trustor or as the last
•will of any beneficiary who has such a power.

Unless the

Trustee has actual notice of the admission to probate of
such a will within 6 months after the death of Trustor or
any such beneficiary, it will be conclusively presumed
that no such will has been admitted to probate, that no
such will exists and that the Trustor or beneficiary, as
the case may be, died intestate and the trust estate shall
be administered accordingly whether or not such a will is
thereafter found to exist.
IN WITNESS WHEREOr, this instrument has been
signed as of the day and year first above written.
NORJ1AN ANDERSON
.

,

:

.

:

:

•

•

^

"Trustor"
JAMES N. ANDERSON

/

/A;
.,., / / / / . / . .,„v" T r u s t e e '
I

JAMES E. MORTON (A 3739)
PAUL D. HATCH (#1418)
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801) 484-3000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID M. DUDLEY, Trustee of the
NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

VS.

)

DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
RALPH PAHNKE and
JOHN DOES I through XXV,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
(JURY DEMANDED)

Civil No. 900907186 CN

)

Plaintiff, David M. Dudley as Trustee of the Norman
Anderson Trust, by and through his counsel of record, Thompson,
Hatch, Morton & Skeen, and for causes of action, complains against
Defendants as follows:
PARTIES
1.

David M. Dudley is an individual acting as Trustee

of the Norman Anderson Trust.
2.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. is a foreign

corporation and is doing business in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
3.

Defendant Ralph Pahnke is an individual residing in

the State of Utah.
4.
herein

The true names and capacities of Defendants named

as John Does

I through XXV, inclusive, are unknown

to

Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious
names.

Plaintiff

will

seek

leave to amend this Complaint

to

include their true names and capacities when the same have been
ascertained.

Plaintiff

alleges

that

each of

the

Defendants

designated herein as John Does I through XXV were responsible, in
some manner, based upon the acts and omissions set forth hereafter, for the events and occurrences referred to hereinafter and
for the resulting

injury

and

damage

to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff

further alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as
John Does I through XXV were, for all relevant periods, an agent
or employee of the other Defendants herein, and were at all times
hereinafter mentioned acting within the purpose and scope of said
agency or employment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5.
executed

On or

about November

a Trust Agreement

which

20, 1978, Norman

created

the Norman

Anderson
Anderson

Trust.
6.

On or about November 28, 1978, Anna Lee Anderson,
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the wife of Norman Anderson, executed a Trust Agreement which
created the Anna Lee Anderson Trust.
7.

In addition, during the approximate same period of

time, both Norman Anderson and Anna Lee Anderson executed their
respective Last Wills and Testaments.
8.

Shortly after the execution by Norman Anderson of

the Trust Agreement establishing the Norman Anderson Trust, Norman
Anderson transferred certain property into said Trust.

Included

in such transfer were 20,500 shares of the common stock of Levi
Straus & Co.
9.

James N. Anderson, Norman Anderson and Anna Lee

Anderson's son, was designated by the Norman Anderson Trust
Agreement as the Trustee for such Trust and has subsequently been
replaced by David M. Dudley as Trustee for such Trust.
10.

On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson

established an account with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
at its Salt Lake City office.
11.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. was furnished

a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at the time such
Trust Account was opened with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
12.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. forwarded a

copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement to its trust department located at the regional office of Dean Witter Reynolds in San
Francisco, California.
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13.

The Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San

Francisco, California reviewed said Trust Agreement and sent
directives to the Salt Lake City office of Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. with respect to the handling by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of
the Norman Anderson Trust.
14.

The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, a copy of

which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", provides for the creation
upon the death of Norman Anderson of two trusts, namely, a
"Marital Trust" and a "Family Trust".
15.

The

provisions

of

the

Norman Anderson

Trust

Agreement direct the Trustee, and third parties dealing with the
Trustee, with respect to the maintenance, administration, management, and distribution of assets held in said Trust.
16.

The Marital Trust requires the Trustee to dis-

tribute income from the Marital Trust to Anna Lee Anderson on at
least a quarterly basis.
17.

In addition, the Marital Trust allows the Trustee

to make distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson for her
care, comfort, support and maintenance including the purchase of
residences.
18.

The Marital Trust also provides that the Trustee

may make distributions of principal to any person designated in
writing by Anna Lee Anderson.
19.

The

Family

Trust

allows

the

Trustee

to make

distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson, provided income
4

from all other sources (including the Marital Trust) are insufficient for her care, comfort, support and maintenance.
20.

The Family Trust provides for the distribution of

the balance of the Family Trust assets after Anna Lee Anderson's
death.
21.

On or about May 8, 1980, Defendant Ralph Pahnke

prepared a letter on the letterhead of Defendant Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. which provided for the distribution of 41,000
shares of the common stock of Levi Straus & Co. as follows:
a.

24,118 shares were distributed to the personal

securities account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of James N.
Anderson;
b.

16,882 shares were distributed to the Anna Lee

Anderson Trust Account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
22.

The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-

buted to James N. Anderson amounted to $871,238.63.
23.

The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-

buted to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust amounted to $609,845.36.
24.

Neither of the distributions were in accordance

with the provisions, terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement which was in the possession of Defendant Pahnke
and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
25.

Subsequent to such distributions, Defendant Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc. continued to manage the Anna Lee Anderson
Trust Account.

During the terms of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s
5

management of such Trust Account, the Trust Account became
valueless.
26.

The distributions

induced by and

affected by

Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds were unlawful,
and in direct contravention of the provisions of the Norman
Anderson Trust Agreement.
27.

Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Rey-

nolds, Inc. owed Anna Lee Anderson, the beneficiary of the Norman
Anderson Trust and the Trustee of said Trust, a duty of inquiry
and a duty of good faith dealing when effectuating transactions
with the Trustee of such Trust.
28.

In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. were required by applicable law to not assist,
induce, aid, abet, or in any other manner facilitate transactions
that were in violation of the terms of the Trust Agreement.
29.

The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. was malicious, and wholly without good cause or
good faith.
30.

As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful,

illegal, negligent, and unconscionable acts of Defendants Pahnke
and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged in an
amount to be proven at trial.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF CONTRACT)
31.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein.
32.

When Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc. accepted an account with the Norman Anderson Trust, they contracted with said Trust to comply with applicable rules and
regulations of the New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, as well as Federal and State law.
33.

In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. contracted to manage the accounts with the highest
standards of fair dealing.
34.

The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. as hereinabove alleged constitutes a breach in
violation of the contract existing between the Trust and Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT)
35.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein.
36.

The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. hereinabove alleged constitutes an unlawful and
tortious interference with the contract rights of Plaintiff.
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37.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants

Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s unlawful and tortious
conduct, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at
trial.
38.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s

conduct was wholly without good cause or good faith.
39.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive

damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter.
40.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees in connection with the prosecution of this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY)
41.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein.
42.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

carefully reviewed the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement to the extent that such Trust Agreement was
forwarded to the Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San
Francisco, California for scrutiny.
43.

In accepting the Norman Anderson Trust and opening

a securities account for said Trust, Defendants Pahnke and Dean
Witter Reynolds became de facto trustees of the Norman Anderson
Trust.
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44.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

owed Plaintiff the degree of care and loyalty

imposed upon

trustees by applicable law.
45.
breached

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

and violated their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff

in

undertaking the wrongful conduct as hereinabove alleged.
46.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants

Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s breach of fiduciary duty,
Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
47.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive

damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter.
48.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in connection with the prosecution of
this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(NEGLIGENCE)
49.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out

in full herein.
50.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

owed Plaintiff a duty to not induce or facilitate the violation of
any provision of the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement.
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51.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

breached and violated their duty to Plaintiff as hereinabove
alleged.
52.

As a direct and proximate result of the careless,

negligent, reckless, and unlawful acts and omissions of Defendants
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged
in an amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as more particularly hereinafter set forth.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., jointly and severally,
as follows:
A.

On Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for breach of

contract, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

(ii)

For costs of Court incurred herein; and

trial;

(iii) For such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper in the premises.
B.

On Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for tortious

interference with contract, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

trial;
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(ii)

For punitive damages in an amount calculated

to punish and deter;
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including
reasonable attorney's fees;
(iv) For such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper in the premises.
C.

On Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for breach of

fiduciary duty, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

(ii)

For punitive damages in an amount calculated

trial;

to punish and deter;
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including
reasonable attorney's fees;
(iv)

For such other and further relief as the

Court deems just and proper in the premises,
D.

On Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for negli-

gence, as follows:
(i)

For damages in an amount to be proven at

(ii)

For costs of Court incurred herein; and

trial;

(iii) For such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper in the premises.

11

DATED this

1%

day of July, 1991.
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN

:ny./rr\

•jarfies E. Morton
At-a^rneys for Plaintiff

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel

of record,

Thompson, Hatch, Morton & Skeen, hereby demands a trial by jury in
this matter.
DATED this

'g(f* day of July, 1991.
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN

By c^P^Kfcr^9
/J'aiaes E. Morton
(Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
20013 N.E. 42nd St.
Redmond, Washington

98053
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (JURY DEMANDED) was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Mr. Joseph J. Palmer, Mr. Reid E. Lewis, Moyle
& Draper, Attorneys for Defendants, 600 Deseret Plaza, No. 15 East
First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

\^fj^\

day of July,

1991.

t £ z ^ oL/a£veZ^
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T^LST AGREE 1E\T

THIS TRUST ACREEilENT is maae this
\Zi vlrulvv'^St ^

QC ^v day c:

t 1978, between NORMAN ANDERSON of Salt

Lake City, Utah, hereinafter sometimes called the "Trustor"
and JAMES N. ANDERSON, of Park City, Utah, hereinafter
sometimes called tne "Trustee".
Trustor does hereby transfer to the Trustee tne
property listed on Scnedule "A" and the Trustee agrees to
hold such property and any other pioperty added to this
Trust on the terns and conditions stated herein.

Trustor

or any other person or persons may add such other property
to the trust property as may be acceptable to the Trustee
by either inter vivos or testamentary transfer; and sucn
additional property wnen delivered to the Trustee shall
become a part of the Trust and be held by the Trustee on
the terms and conditions stated herein.
ARTICLE I
DESIGNATION AND PURPOSE OF TRUST
1.1

Designation.

This Trust may be designated

the NORMAN ANDERSON TPUST.
1.2

Purpose.

This Trust is established for the

primary benefit of Trustor during Trustor's lifetime and
of Trustor's family.

Trustor's family consists of Trustor's

wife, Anna Lee Anderson, and Trustor's son, James N.
Anderson.
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ARTICLE II
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL
DURING THE LIFETIME OF TRUSTOR
During the lifetime of the Trustor, such part
or all of the income and/or principal of the trust estate
shall be paid or delivered to such persons and in such
amounts from time to time as the Trustor shall direct in
writing signed by Trustor and delivered to Trustee; or in
the absence of such direction, the Trustee shall pay or
apply for the benefit of a class consisting of Trustor
and Trustor's wife or any member of such class, such
amounts to such persons as in his sole and absolute discretion he deems necessary and proper for the health,
support, maintenance and welfare of Trustor and said
wife.
ARTICLE III
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL
UPON DEATH OF TRUSTOR
3.1

Settlement of Debts and Expenses.

Upon

the death of the Trustor, the Trustee may, in th sole and
absolute discretion of the Trustee, pay from the Trust or
advance such sums to the estate or personal representative
of Trustor, with or without interest, as may be necessary
for the settlement of Trustor's estate, such amounts as
expenses of his last illness, funeral and burial, debts
of the Trustor, inheritance taxes, estate taxes and other
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taxes lmposec o\ the state or federal covernreit, and any
and all expenses of administration of Trustor's estate.
Provided, however, that the foregoing may not be satisfied
from the proceeds (i) of any life insurance policy on the
life of Trustor, or (11) of any death benefit payable by
reason of the Trustor having been a participant in an employee
benefit plan if such proceeds are not includes in the
Trustor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
3.2

Trustor's Family.

Upon the death of Trustor,

the Trustee may make the payments provided in Section 3.1,
if any, or make adequate provision therefor, and shall
divide and distribute the trust estate then remaining,
including income, as follows:
3.2.1

Wife Not Surviving.

If Trustor's

wife does not survive Trustor (and it is hereby
directed that for purposes of this Trust if
Trustor and Trustor's wife shall die under
circumstances that it is difficult or impossible
to determine who died first, Trustor's wife shall
be presumed to have survived Trustor), the Trustee
shall hold, administer and distribute the trust
estate, including all assets distributable to
the Trust by reason of the death of Trustor, in
one Trust, to be called the "Family Trust" to
be administered as provided in 3.4.

3.2.2

Wife Surviving.

If Trustor's w^fe

does survive Trustor, the Trustee shall divide
the trust estate, including all assets distributable to the Trust by reason of the death of
Trustor, into two separate trusts, the first to
be called the "Marital Trust" and the second the
"Family Trust" to be administered as provided in
3.3 and 3.4.
A.

Marital Trust Allocation.

There

shall be placed in the Marital Trust
that portion of the trust estate which
is equal in value, as finally determined for
federal estate tax purposes, to the amount
which is equal to the lesser of
(1)

The maximum allowable marital

deduction under federal estate tax laws
or
(2)

The minimum amount which, after

allowing for any unified credit which has
not been allowed during Trustor's lifetime, and any other deductions, exemptions
or credits which will result in no federal
estate tax being imposed on Trustor's
estate.
and which is reduced by the value of any property
or any interests in property as finally deternmec
for federal estate tax purposes which passes
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or has passed from Trustor to Trustor's wife,
other than through the Marital Trust, by
reason of said wife being a surviving joint
tenant, or an insurance beneficiary, inchoate
dower or any statutory interest similar
thereto, by operation of law, or otherwise.
However, there shall not be allocated to tne
Marital Trust, any property or interest in
property or the proceeds of any property or
assets which do not qualify for the marital
deduction for federal estate tax purposes;
nor shall there be allocated to the Marital
Trust except when other assets are insufficient to satisfy such fractional share, any
property or interest in property or the
proceeds of any property or assets (1) with
respect to which any tax credit or deduction
shall be available because it is subject to
both federal estate and federal incore tax;
or (ii) with respect to which any estate or
death taxes are paid to any foreign country
or any of its possessions or subdivisions.
The Marital Trust shall not be reduced for
any inheritance or estate taxes, payable as
a result of the death of Trustor.

The Trustee

must allocate to the Marital Trust property
or assets, including cash, fairly representative

of the appreciation or depreciation m

t^e

value of all property available for distribution to sucn Trust.
B.

Family Trust Allocation.

There

shall be placed in the Family Trust that
portion of the trust estate not allocated
to the Marital Trust.
3.3

Marital Trust.

The estate and property of the

Marital Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts as
follows:
3.3.1

Distribution During Lifetime of Wife.

During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after Trustor's
death:
A.

The Trustee shall pa> to the

Trustor's wxfe, commencing as of the date of
Trustor's death, all of the income from the
Trust in monthly or other convenient installments, but m

no event less frequently than

in quarter-annual installments; and
B.

Whenever the Trustee determines that

the funds available to Trustor's wife from
all sources, including the income from the
Marital Tr-ast, axe not sxili icier* t iox the
proper care, maintenance, support and travel,
including but not limited to the needs arising
from illness, accident or misfortune of

Trustor's wife and family, and for funds
to enable the purchase of residences, the
Trustee, at any time and from time to time,
may in his sole discretion pay or distribute
to Trustor's wife so much of the principal
of the Trust as he snail deem necessary or
advisable under the circumstances.
C.

The Trustee shall pay out of

principal of the Marital Trust such amount
or amounts, up to the full amount thereof,
as Trustor's wife shall from time to time
designate in writing delivered to Trustee
to any person or persons, including Trustor's
wife.
3.3.2

Distributions on Death of Wife.

Upon

the death of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall pay
over, deliver and distribute all of the rest,
residue and remainder of the Trust to such persons and parties, including the estate of Trustor's
wife, as Trustor's wife shall direct or appoint by
provision of the last will of said wife specifically
referring to this power of appointment; to the
extent this general power of appointment is not
exercised, then upon the death of Trustor's wife
the Trustee shall continue to hold, aduinister
and distribute the remainder of the Marital Trust
as shall not have been appointed by Trustor's
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wife, suD]ect to ana under the provisions of 3.4.
3.4

Fanily Trust.

The estate and property of tne

Family Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts
as follows:
3.4.1
Wife.

Distributions During Lifetime of

During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after

Trustor's death, whenever the Trustee determines
that the funds available to Trustor's wife from all
sources, including the income and principal from
the Marital Trust are not sufficient for the proper
care, maintenance, support and travel, including but
not limited to the needs arising from illness,
accident or misfortune of Trustor's wife, and for
funds to enable the purchase of residences, the
Trustee, at any time and from time to time, may
in his sole discretion pay or distribute to Trustor's
wife so much of the income and/or principal of the
Trust as he shall deem necessary or advisable under the
circumstances.
3* 4 * 2

Distribution on Death of Wife.

Upon

the death of Trustor's wife, if Trustor's wife
survives Trustor; the Trustee shall distribute the
remainder of the Family Trust to or for the benefit
of a class or any member or memners thereof consisting of Trustor's son, the descendants of Trustor's
son, including any of such descendants now living

or hereafter born, the spouses of Trustor's son anc
the spouses of the descendants of Trustor's son
(including surviving spouses oi Trustor's deceased
son and his descendants) as Trustor's wife shall direct
or appoint by provision of the last will of said
wife specifically referring to this special power
of appointment; to the extent this special power of
appointment is not exercised, then upon the death
of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall distribute
the remainder of the Family Trust as shall not have
been appointed by Trustor's wife to Trustor's son,
James N. Anderson, if he is then living, but if he
is not then living to Trustor's son's then living
descendants, upon the principle of representation,
sub]ect to the provisions of 3.5.

If none of the

descendants of Trustor are then living, the Trustee
shall distribute the entire trust estate tc the
heirs at law of Trustor as determined pursuant to
the laws of descent and distribution of tne State
of Utah in effect at such time as if Trustor had
died at such time.
3.4.3

Distribution on Death of Trustor.

Upon Trustor's death if Trustor's wife does not
survive Trustor, the Trustee shall distribaye the
Family Trust to Trustor's son, James N. Anderson,
if he is then living but if he is not then living to
Trustor's son's then living descendants upon the
principle of representation, sub}ect to tse provisions
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of 3.5.

If none of the descendants of Trustor are

then living, the Trustee shall distribute the entire
trust estate to the heirs at law of Truster as determined pursuant to the laws of descent and distribution of the State of Utah m

effect at such time

as if Trustor had died at such time.
3*5

Minor Beneficiaries Trust.

If under any

provision of this Trust any beneficiary becomes entitled
to final distribution of any share or portion of the trust
estate and such beneficiary is not of the age of 21 years,
the share of such beneficiary shall be retained by the
Trustee, until such beneficiary attains the age of 21
years, paying out such portion of the income and principal
thereof as the Trustee in its sole discretion deems necessary
or advisable to provide for the care, comfort, support,
maintenance and education of such beneficiary and distributing any undistributed portion of such share or portion
of a share to such beneficiary when ne or she attains
the age of 21 years, or to his or her estate if he or
she should die before attaining the age of 21 years.
ARTICLE IV
AMENDMENT OR REVOCATION
4.1

During Lifetime of Trustor.

The Trustor

reserves the right at any time or times to amend or revoke
this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in
part, by an instrument or instruments in writing signed
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by Trustor and delivered m
Trustee.

Trustor s lifetir.e to the

If this instrument is revoked in its entirety,

the revocation shall take effect upon the delivery of the
required writing to the Trustee.

On the revocation of this

instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to
the Trustor, or as Trustor may direct in the instrument of
revocation, all of the trust property.
4.2

By Will of Trustor.

The Trustor reserves

the right to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts
hereunder, in whole or in part, by his last will which
specifically refers to this instrument and specifically
directs what amendments are to be made or states that
the instrument is revoked.

If this instrument is revoked

in its entirety by tne last will cf the Trustor, the Trustee
shall deliver to the Trustor's estate, or as Trustor's
will may direct, all of the trust property.
4.3

Acceptance by Trustee.

If this Trust or

any provision thereof is amended, the amendment shall
take effect only when accepted in writing by the Trustee.
This Trust shall be irrevocable and unamendable during
any period of incompetency of the Trustor and shall become
irrevocable and unamendable upon the death of the Trustor
or prior thereto if by amendment Trustor has relinquished
all of Trustor's rignt to amend or revoke this instrument.
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ARTICLE V
POWTRS OF TRUSTEE
The Trustee shall have all of the powers as stated
in Part 4 of Chapter 7 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and
entitled Uniform Trustee's Powers Provisions

In addition

thereto and not by way of limitation, the Trustee shall
have the power, to retain any asset originally or later
contributed to the trust estate whether or not such asset
be of a character permissible for investment by fiduciaries;
to retain and purchase assets with a view to possible
increase in value notwithstanding the amount or absence
of income therefrom; to retain and purchase assets notwithstanding the lack of diversification of the trust
assets; to retain, purchase, sell or exchange any and all
stocks, bonds, notes or other securities or any variety
of real or personal property, including stocks or interests
in investments, mutual funds to make distributions of
principal or income in kind; to enter into any transaction,
including, but not limited by advancing funds, purchasing
assets, selling assets (and paying, with or without arrangements for reimbursement, any sums necessary for the settlement of the estate of Trustor) with the Trustee or legal
representative of any other trust or estate in which any
beneficiary hereunder has any beneficial interest even thougn
such Trustee or legal representative is also Trustee hereunder; and to commingle the funds and assets of any trust

-13estate hereunder with any other trust estate nereuncer so
long as proper records are Kept of tne assets allocao^to any such trust.
ARTICLE VI
INSURANCE PROVISIONS
6.1

Power in the Trustor.

The Trustor reserves

the right by Trustor's own act alone, without the consent
or approval of the Trustee, to sell, assign or hypothecate
any policies of insurance made payable to the Trustee
hereunder, to exercise any option or privilege grantee by
such policies, including, but without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiary of
such policies, and to receive all payments, dividends,
surrender values, benefits or privileges of any kind wnich
may accrue on account of such policies during Trustor's
lifetime.

Furthermore, the Trustee agrees to deliver to

the Trustor on Trustor's written request signed by Trustor
and delivered to Trustee any of such policies depositee
with the Trustee hereunder.
6.2

Duties of Trustee.

The Trustee shall hold

any policies of insurance which may be deposited wit*1
him, but without any obligation to pay premiums, assessments or other charges upon any of the policies or to
otherwise preserve them or any of them as binding contracts of insurance.

Upon the death of the insured or

upon the maturity date of any policy assigned or payaole
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to the Trustee, the Trustee shall take such proceedings as
in his judgment he shall deem necessary to collect all
proceeds due on the policies and he may, if he so elects,
exercise any settlement options available under the policies.
The Trustee is authorized to compromise and adjust claims
arising out of such insurance policies, upon such terirs
and conditions as the Trustee shall deem advisable, and to
the extent necessary may maintain or defend amy suit,
provided, however, the Trustee shall be under no dutv
to maintain or enter into any litigation unless his expenses,
including counsel fees and costs, have been advanced or
guaranteed in an amount and in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the Trustee.

The Trustee may repay any advances

made by him or reimburse himself for any such fees and costs
out of the principal or income of this Trust.

The receipt

of the Trustee to the insurer shall be a full discharge
of the insurer and Trustee alone shal] thereafter be required
to see to the application of the proceeds.
ARTICLE VII
THE TRUSTEE
7.1

Accounting.

With respect to each separate

trust created herein, the Trustee shall render annually
an account of income and principal, including a statement
of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to
all beneficiaries then eligible to receive income or to
the natural or legal guardians of such beneficiaries, upon,
bat only upon the request of any such beneficiary.
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7.2

Bond.

No bond shall be required of the

original Trustee hereunder or of any successor trustee
or, if bond is required by law, no surety on such bond
shall be required.
7.3

Compensation.

The Trustee shall be entitled

to a reasonable fee for his services commensurate with
fees charged by corporate trustees in Salt Lake City, Utah
for similar services.

The Trustee may charge a reasonable

fee for transfers to a successor trustee and for any final
distribution of any share of the trust estate based upon the
work involved in such transfer or final distribution.
7.4

Resignation.

The Trustee may resign at any

time by giving thirty (30) days written notice to Trustor,
or, after the death of the Trustor, to Trustor's wife.
Upon such notice, Trustor, or after the death of Trustor,
Trustor's wife may appoint a successor trustee.

If no such

appointment is made within thirty (30) days after the
Trustee gives its notice of resignation, then the District
Court of Salt Lake County or any judge thereof may appoint
a successor trustee upon application of the resigning
Trustee or of any other interested party.
7-5

Removal.

The Trustee may be removed by the

Trustor or after the death of the Trustor, by Trustor's
wife by giving thirty (30) days written notice signed
by Trustor, or Trustor's wife, as the case may be and
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delivered to Trustee, in whicn the successor trustee
is designated to the then acting Trustee.
7.6

Successor Trustee.

A successor trustee may

be either a corporation authorized under applicable law to
act as trustee or an individual.

Any such successor trustee

shall act as Trustee hereunder without the execution or
filing of any writing or any further action on the part of
Trustor or of his wife or of any beneficiary hereunder.

Upon

the appointment of a successor trustee, the former Trustee
shall promptly make an accounting and distribute all
assets of the trust estate to the successor trustee.

An

additional or successor trustee shall not be liable for
any action taken by the Trustee prior to the time such
additional or successor trustee becomes a trustee.
ARTICLE VIII
MISCELLANEOUS
8.1

Powers of Appointment.

The power of the

donee over any power of appointment granted in this agreement shall include all lawful exercises thereof, without
limitation, specifically including but not limited to,
the power to make appointments outright to, or to a trustee
to hold in trust for the exclusive benefit of, any one or
more of the object of the power; to create life estates
and other limited estates; to create general and special
powers of appointment and to appoint subject to lawful
spendthrift restrictions and other lawful conditions, provided that no one other than an object of the power is
benefited thereby.
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8.2

Spenct-rirt Clause.

The interest or eacn

beneficiary in the mcone or principal of any trust created
hereunder shall be free from the control or interference
of any creditor of a beneficiary or of any spouse of a
married beneficiary and shall not be subject to attachment
or susceptible of anticipation or alienation.

Nothing con-

tained in this paragraph 8.2 shall be construed as restrictirg
in any way the exercise of any pouer or discretion granted
hereunder.
8.3

Definitions.

References herein to "child"

or "children" refer only to the child designated in
Article I.

References herein to "descendant" or "descendants"

shall mean lawful blood descendants in the first, second or
other degree of the ancestor designated andr in all such
cases, (a) an adopted child and such adopted child's lawful blood descendants shall be considered as lawful blood
descendants of the adopting parent or parents and of anyone
who is by blood or adoption an ancestor of the adopting
parent or of either of the adopting parents, and (b) a
child in gestation which is later born alive shall be
regarded as a child in being during the period of gestation.
8.4 Governing Law.

This agreement has been

accepted by the Trustee in the State of Utah and all
questions concerning its construction shall be governed
by the laws of that state.

All questions concerning the

administration of the Trust shaLl be governed by the laws
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of the jurisdiction in whicn the principal office of the
Trustee (from time to time acting) is located.
8.5

Invalid Provisions.

If any provision of

this Trust is held to be invalid, none of the other provisions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative,
but such provisions shall be given full force and effect
as herein provided.

If any provisions of this trust

instrument violate the rules against perpetuities now or
hereafter in effect, in the state within which this Trust
is being administered, that portion of the trust or trusts
so affected shall be administered as herein provided until
the termination of the maximum period authorized by law,
at which time and forthwith such part of the said trust
estate so affected shall be distributed in fee simple to
the beneficiary or beneficiaries in the proportions in
which they are then entitled to enjoy the benefits so
terminated.

For purposes of computing such time rules,

the lives in being shall be those of the Trustor, Trustor's
wife and their descendants living at the time the trust
or trusts herein established become irrevocable.
8.6

Residence Property.

If any residence of

Trustor or Trustor's wife is or becomes a part of any
trust estate created hereunder, the Trustee is authorized
and directed to allow Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either
of them, to use and occupy any such residence without payment
of rent therefor for so long as Trustor and Trustor's wife,
or either of them, continue to so occupy such residence or
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residences.

During such occupancy, Truster nereo^ authorizes

but does not direct Trustee, to pay, in his discretion,
from the income or principal of the trust estate wn.ch
holds an interest in any such residence, any taxes, assessments, fire and casualty and liabiLity insurance premiums,
maintenance costs, ordinary repairs and replacements and
reasonable improvements for any such residence.

Witn the

written consent of Trustor, or after Trustor's deatn,
Trustor's wife, signed by Trustor or Trustor's wife, as
the case may be, and delivered to Trustee, the Trustee
may sell such residence.

If requested in such writing

the proceeds of the sale (together with any additional
assets of the trust estate) shall be used by the Trustee
to purchase, acquire, or build a substitute residence,
taking title in the name of the Trustee and allowing
Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either of them, to occupy
such residence on the terms previously set out in tnis
paragraph.

If a substitute residence is not requested in

such writing, the proceeds of the sale of any sucn residence
shall be held, administered and distributee by the Trustee
pursuant to the terms of the Trust estate involved without
regard to this paragraph.
8.7

Trustee May Rely on Wills - Presumption

In ascertaining whether there has been an amendment of this
Trust by the last will of the Trustor or whetner tnere has
been an exercise of any powers which have been granted to
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any beneficiary nerem arc whicn may be exercised by anv
such beneficiary's last *ill, tne Trustee shall be protectee
in relying upon an instrument admitted to probate in any
jurisdiction as the last will of the Trustor or as the last
will of any beneficiary who has such a power.

Unless the

Trustee has actual notice of the admission to probate of
such a will within 6 months after the death of Trustor or
any such beneficiary, it will be conclusively presumed
that no such will has been admitted to probate, that no
such will exists and that the Trustor or beneficiary, as
the case may be, died intestate and the trust estate shall
be administered accordingly whether or not such a will is
thereafter found to exist.
IN WITNESS WHEREOr, this instrument has been
signed as of the day and year first above written.
NORJ1AN ANDERSON

"Trustor"
JAMES N. ANDERSON

.U. ,j//
' /

A . /. . r g
"Trustee

JAMES E. MORTON, A3739
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS, #4699
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 484-3000

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA LEE ANDERSON,

]
i
;
;i

Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, I N C ,
a Foreign Corporation, RALPH
PAHNKE, and JOHN DOES 1
through 25,

|
]
]
]
i

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Trial Court No. 900907186CN

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant/Appellee.

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff/Appellant, Anna Lee
Anderson, through counsel James E. Morton of Thompson, Hatch,
Morton & Skeen, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the
final Orders of the Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick entered in this
matter on September 16, 1991 and September 27, 1991.
Orders

dismissed

this

action

in

Plaintiff/Appellant hereby appeals.

its

entirely

from

These
which,

DATED t h i s

fffjfc

day o f O c t o b e r ,

1991.

THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN

ltf&

fAMESE. MORTON

Att^oisieys
reliant

for

Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed to Joseph J.
Palmer, Reid E. Lewis at Moy le; and Draper, 600 Deseret Plaza, #15
East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this

day

of October, 1991.
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